《保险研究》20240302-《负面信息如何影响农户对保险公司的信任》（张跃华、阎文溯、Calum G.Turvey）

［摘   要］保险需求“不足”是阻碍保险高质量发展的重要问题。缺乏信任可能是导致参保不足的重要原因之一，而信息是信任成立的关键因素。本文基于负面信息(行政约谈)冲击下保险信任的重复博弈模型，构建农户信任形成的分析框架，利用2017、2018年河南省A市养猪业的随机抽样数据和认可实验，引入背叛厌恶研究负面信息对农户信任的削弱影响及机制。研究发现，负面信息会显著降低农户对保险公司的信任，农户对保险公司的信任具有背叛厌恶的性质，为保险公司自我约束展业行为、提高农业保险保障水平提供了学理依据。

［关键词］农业保险；负面信息；投保人信任；背叛厌恶；认可实验

［基金项目］本研究受到教育部人文社科规划项目(20YJA790093)、国家社科基金重大项目(23&ZD045)及中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金、浙江大学文科教师教学科研发展专项项目资助。

［作者简介］张跃华，浙江大学公共管理学院、浙江大学长三角智慧绿洲创新中心教授；阎文溯，浙江大学公共管理学院博士生；Calum G.Turvey，康奈尔大学Dyson应用经济与管理学院教授。

How does Negative Information Affect Farmers′ Trust in Insurance Companies

ZHANG Yue-hua,YAN Wen-su,Calum Turvey

Abstract：Insufficient demands are an important issue hindering the high-quality development of the insurance industry,while information is the key factor for the establishment of trust.Based on the repeated game model of insurance trust under the impact of negative information (regulatory talk),this paper constructs an analytical framework for the formation of farmers′ trust,and introduces betrayal aversion to study the weakening effect and mechanism of negative information on farmers′ trust,empirically using the random sampling data and accreditation experiments of swine raising industry in A City,Henan Province in 2017 and 2018.It is found that negative information significantly reduces farmers′ trust in insurance companies,and verifies the betrayal aversion nature of farmers′ trust,which provides a theoretical basis for insurance companies to self-regulate their business behaviors and to improve the level of agricultural insurance protection.

Key words：agricultural insurance;negative information;policyholder trust;betrayal aversion;accreditation experiment